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RATIONAL BARGAINING THEORY AND
CONTRACT: DEFAULT RULES,
HYPOTHETICAL CONSENT, THE
DUTY TO DISCLOSE, AND
FRAUD
RANDY

E.

BARNE'IT*

In his forthcoming book, Risks and Wrongs, 1 Jules Coleman
covers a lot of territory, ranging from political to moral philosophy, from tort theory to the theory of crimes. Along the way,
he touches upon important issues of contract theory, including
the question of how the default rules of contract ought to be
chosen. The concept of default rules is of particular interest to
me because it undermines the legal realist view that, because all
of contract law fills gaps in consent, the substance of contract
law has little to do with consent. Once it is acknowledged, however, that most of contract law consists of default rather than
immutable rules, then consent plays a far larger role in contract
theory than is often admitted. For when certain conditions obtain, the parties' silence in the face of a default rule could well
constitute consent to its imposition.
In this paper, I begin by responding to Coleman's rational
choice approach to choosing default rules. In Part I, I apply the
expanded analysis of contractual consent and default rules I
have recently presented elsewhere2 to explain how rational bargaining, hypothetical consent, and actual consent figure in the
determination of contractual default rules. Whereas Coleman
advocates the centrality of rational bargaining analysis to this
determination, I explain why rational bargaining theory's role
must be subsidiary to that of consent.
I then tum my attention to Coleman's appraisal of contracting parties' duty to disclose information concerning theresources that are the subject of a contractual transfer. In Part II,
I argue that both Coleman's and Anthony Kronman's analyses

* Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar and Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. jULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript datedjuly
1991, on file with author; pages cited to manuscript).
2. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REV. 821 (1992).

Harvard journal of Law & Public Policy

784

[Vol. 15

of John Marshall's opinion in the classic case of Laidlaw v. Organ 3 overlook an important function of his holding permitting
nondisclosure. I conclude by proposing a conception of fraud
that explains why trading on and profiting from certain types of
undisclosed information is not properly deemed fraudulent.
I.
A.

DEFAULT RULES AND HYPOTHETICAL CONSENT

Coleman~

Analysis of Default Rules and Hypothetical Consent

A default rule is a type of gap-filling background rule that is
used by courts to interpret matters about which a contract is
silent. What distinguishes default rules from other kinds of
background rules is that they can be supplanted by the expressed consent of the parties, whereas "immutable" background rules will be enforced no matter what the parties may
say on the matter. 4 An example of a default rule is the use by
courts of the expectancy measure of damages for breach of
contract. 5 An example of an immutable rule, which parties cannot contract around, is the implied duty of good faith performance of a contract. 6
In his discussion of contract, Coleman addresses the question of how default rules should be chosen. As Coleman notes,
many law-and-economics scholars have argued that default
rules should reflect those rights and duties to which the parties
would have agreed ex ante.
Thus, when transaction costs make an explicit agreement too
costly ex ante, the court should apply a default or gap-filling
rule that "mimics" the outcome of a hypothetical contract
between them. The hypothetical contract is one the parties
would have made had the transaction costs not made their
doing so irrational. 7

Coleman sees this approach as raising the following problem:
3. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
4. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in lncomplele Con/racls: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87 (1989) ("Default rules fill the gaps in incomplete
contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around them. Immutable rules cannot be contracted around; they govern even if the parties attempt to contract around
them.").
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS§ 347 (1979).
6. Compare U.C.C. § 1-203 ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.") wilh U.C.C. § 1-102(3) ("The
effect of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided in this act
and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care pre·
scribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement ....").
7. CoLEMAN, supra note 1, at 268 (footnotes omitted).
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"Given the ex post nature of the obligations and rights it distributes, is there any reason to think that one default rule is any
more justifiable than another? Is there, in particular, a case to
be made for the ex ante contract as the default rule?" 8 Coleman
contends that rational bargaining theory can both determine
the content of counterfactual "majoritarian" default rules 9 and
justify their imposition by a legal system.
Coleman argues, first, that rational bargaining theory is the
best way to determine the scope and content of parties' hypothetical consent. Then he attempts to connect his rational bargaining approach to hypothetical consent with actual consent. Io
Coleman's project is ultimately to convince anyone who is already committed either to consent or to efficiency accounts of
contractual obligation that a rational bargaining model must
occupy a central place in their theories of obligation.
Coleman argues that a consent theorist could favor a rational
bargaining approach to hypothetical contracts for two reasons.
The first is that "[h]ypothetical consent is a proxy for actual
consent," II and a rational bargaining model can determine the
content of hypothetical consent. A court searching for what the
parties have agreed upon when they are silent will choose a hypothetical provision that, at the time of formation, appears to
improve the lot of at least one of the parties and not worsen the
situation of either. "From the fact that [such a solution] makes
no one worse off ... we are to infer that [the parties] would
have consented. Consent follows as a matter of logic from considerations of rational self-interest."I 2
The problem with this analytic connection between rational
self-interest and hypothetical consent is patent, and Coleman is
quick to note it: The concept of rational seff-interest is doing
all the work. Hypothetical "consent" becomes merely a label
that is attached to the conclusion with no explanatory or justifi8. Id. at 268.
9. Default rules conforming to a hypothetical bargain are commonly called
"majoritarian" because they seek to identifY the term to which most parties would have
agreed. I call them "counterfactual" because they refer to what most parties would
have but did not agree to. In contrast, what I call "conventionalist" default rules, discussed below, refer to what most parties do in fact mean by their silence.
10. Coleman also argues why an efficiency theorist might have use for the rational
bargaining approach, but I leave this issue to others. See Richard Craswell, Efficiency and
Rational Bargaining in Contractual Settings, 15 HARv.J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 805 (1992).
11. CoLEMAN, supra note 1, at 269.
12. Id. at 272.
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catory force of its own. "[I]n arguments of this sort," Coleman
explains,
there appears to be nothing expressed by the concept of hypothetical consent that is not already captured in the idea of
rational self-interest. The distinction between consent and
rational self-interest central to moral theory apparently
evaporates. The claim that imposing obligations ex post is justified because the parties would have consented to them ex
ante adds nothing to a defense of such a proposal that is not
already expressed by the argument that imposing obligations ex post is justified whenever such obligations would have
been rational for the parties ex ante. Thus, one might say that
the reliance on ex ante rational bargaining provides a rationality or welfarist defense of the default rule, not a consensualist one. 13

Instead, Coleman recommends that the consent theorist view
the relationship between hypothetical rational bargaining and
hypothetical consent as epistemic, not analytic.
What it would have been rational for the parties to bargain
to ex ante is not equivalent to, nor does it entail, anything
about what they would have agreed to, but it is, nevertheless,
evidence, perhaps the best evidence, of it.... In the absence
of contradictory evidence, that is evidence contrary to that
derived from the hypothetical rational bargain, it is legitimate to infer that the parties would have consented to that
which would have been the outcome of a rational bargain
between them. 14

Having established an epistemic connection between the hypothetical rational bargain and the concept of hypothetical consent, however, this approach immediately confronts the
following problem: What connection, if any, exists between hypothetical consent and actual consent? Why should one care
about consent that by hypothesis is hypothetical?
Coleman considers the argument that, by consenting ex ante
to legal enforcement, parties consent to the enforcement ex post
of default rules chosen according to the rational bargaining
method.
[B]y the very act of contracting the parties consent not only
to a framework of explicitly created rights and duties, but to
a jurisdiction for resolving conflicts that might arise in construing those rights and duties. Should the occasion arise,
13. Id. I concur.
14. /d. at 273.
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the jurisdiction to which the parties consent is authorized to
impose rights and duties ex post that were not made explicit ex
ante. To contract is, among other things, to consent to the
relevant default provisions of a particular jurisdiction. Thus,
the rights and responsibilities allocated by a default rule ex
post are, in a suitable sense, consented to ex ante. 15
According to Coleman, this approach avoids the need to specify the relationship between rational bargaining and hypothetical consent by positing the existence of actual consent to the
terms determined by a rational bargaining model. "The importance ofhypothetical consent simply disappears, and with it the
need to establish an evidentiary or analytic connection between
it and the ex ante rational bargain." 16
Coleman makes two criticisms of this "consent to jurisdiction" approach. First, he argues that if this "argument for the
default rule works at all, it works too well," 17 because it would
apparently justify any default rule, and even any immutable rule,
a legal system may impose. "For if by consenting to a contract,
one consents to ajurisdiction's default rule, then one consents
to whatever rule the court applies: from those aimed at reconstructing a hypothetical bargain to those imposing obnoxious
terms, and so on." 18 Second, Coleman questions "whether it
works at all." 19 Representing parties' consent to legal enforcement as a consent to the entire take-it-or-leave-it set of default
rules that will be applied is unrealistic because parties hardly
have any choice among jurisdictions. As Coleman argues:
[T]he parties could be said to consent to a relevant authority's default rule only if they willingly, that is, noncoercively,
choose it. This is not typically the case, however. The default
rules of any jurisdiction are generally a nonnegotiable part
of their bargain. Though the parties can often contract
around them, they cannot substitute the default provisions
15. !d. at 273-74. This argument is not entirely hypothetical. I originally offered it to
Professor Coleman in private correspondence relating to his earlier incarnation of the
subject in jules L. Coleman, Douglas D. Heckathorn, & Steven M. Maser, A Bargaining
Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARv.J.L. &
Pun. PoL'Y 639 (1989). I develop the argument considerably in Barnett, supra note 2.
16. CoLEMAN, supra note I, at 274.
17. ld. at 275.
18. Coleman goes on to say: "This reconstruction of the consent theory of contractual obligation, in other words, provides no sense in which the ex ante rational contract
is special. If the ex ante rational bargain as a default rule has a special attraction for this
sort of consent theorist, this line of argument does not do a very good job of expressing or developing it." ld. at 274-75. But this assumes what must be shown-that a
consent theorist does care about the ex ante bargain.
19. ld. at 275.
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of other jurisdictions. For that reason, it is questionable
whether by consenting to a framework of contractual rights
and responsibilities the parties consent to the application of
the operative default provisions. 20

From the failure of this argument, Coleman concludes that rational bargaining theory, not consent, provides the justification
for choosing default rules that reflect hypothetical consent. Far
from consent being the basis of contract, consent is significant
only because terms that are actually chosen are likely in practice to reflect what is rational for parties to have chosen.
"Thus," according to Coleman, "one might say that the reliance on an ex ante rational bargaining provides a rationality or
welfarist defense of the default rule, not a consensualist one." 21
In the next section, I recast the "consent to jurisdiction" approach to avoid both these challenges. After clarifying the relationship between consent and the hypothetical rational
bargain, I conclude that while the rational bargain model may
play a role in a consent theory, it is hardly as central a role as
Coleman contends.
B. Reconstructing the "Consent to jurisdiction" Argument
In a sense, we have joined a story in the middle. Whereas
Coleman begins by assuming implicitly the validity of the hypothetical rational bargain and only then asks how a consent theorist might account for it, a consent theorist argues that consent
is central to the creation of contractual obligation. 22 Thus, the
issue is what, if any, relationship exists between consent and a
rational bargain model. If there is no such relationship, then so
much the worse for the rational hypothetical bargain.
Let me begin by offering a more complete presentation of
20. !d.
21. !d. at 272.
22. I have explained briefly why consent is of central importance to contract in
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986)[hereinafter
Barnett, Consent Theory], and at greater length in Barnett, supra note 2; see also Randy E.
Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1223
(1984); Randy E. Barnett, The Internal and External Analysis of Concepts, 11 CARDOZO L.
REv. 525 (1990); Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational
Theory of Contract, 78 VA. L. REv. 1175 (1992); Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker,
Be;·ond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Fonnalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HoFSTRA
L. REv. 443 (1987). A condensed and revised account of this approach appears in
Randy E. Barnett, Rights and Remedies in a Consent Theory of Contract in LIABILITY AND
RESPONSIBILITY: EssAYS IN LAw AND MoRALS 135 (R.G. Frey & Christopher Morris eds.,
1991).
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the "consent to jurisdiction" argument that Coleman summarizes. In making a legally enforceable agreement, parties consent to more than the explicit terms in their agreement. To
enter the realm of contract, and leave the realm of mere promise, the parties must signal or communicate their intention to
be legally bound. This "manifested intention to be legally
bound" is what I call "consent." 23 By manifesting such an intention, parties consent to the jurisdiction of some (monopoly
or competitive) adjudicative and enforcement mechanism.
Their consent forms the basis for an adjudicator's authority to
render a binding judgment in a pure contracts case. Without
this added implication, a consent to be legally bound means no
more than any other commitment or promise. 24
Thus, consent to be legally bound must entail both parties
accepting one of two propositions:
(a) When a dispute arises that is not covered by an explicit
term of the contract, whatever court has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute loses its jurisdiction and any loss that may
have resulted from the transaction remains where it happened to fall; or
(b) When a dispute arises that is not covered by an explicit
term of the contract, whatever court has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute retains its jurisdiction and may allocate the
loss according to some set of principles.

While each of these propositions is logically consistent with a
manifested intention to be legally bound, when parties are silent on this issue, the actual meaning of their expression of assent must be determined conventionally. Because the concept
of consent is a communicative one, we must always seek the
most plausible interpretation of the conduct of the parties
within the relevant community of discourse. 25
If the second of these propositions more accurately ex23. I leave to one side the important issue of how manifested consent is related to
subjective assent. As I explain elsewhere, a manifested consent can be "real" even when
unaccompanied by subjective assent because communicated consent is the concept of
consent that is at the root of contract theory. Admittedly, however, one reason for the
centrality of communicated consent is its close empirical correspondence with subjective assent. See generally Barnett, supra note 2, at 898-902.
24. While adequate for present purposes, this statement of the principle is incomplete. Prima fade contractual obligation arises when a person "voluntarily performs acts
that convey[] her intention to create a legally enforceable obligation by transferring
alienable rights." Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 22, at 300. This refined version of
the principle is needed to handle problems that are beyond the scope of this article.
25. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 855-59.
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presses the actual intentions of most contracting parties when
they consent to be legally bound, then there is an implicit consent to resolve disputes not governed by explicit contract terms
according to promulgated background rules and procedures.
Thus, courts enforce background rules with actual, not hypothetical, consensual authorization. This is not to claim, however, that courts are always free to enforce any background rule
whatsoever when parties consent to be legally bound. The next
question is to determine the content of the background rules
whose enforcement can be justified as consensual.
When the cost of learning the content of and contracting
around contract law is sufficiently low, by remaining silent on a
particular matter, parties can be said to have consented to any
promulgated default rule. 26 That is, silence under these circumstances manifests a consent to the enforcement of those
rules that one could have changed by one's express agreement
but did not. When, however, these conditions do not obtain, it
is no longer safe to conclude that silence means consent to
whatever background rules may happen to exist.
In the absence of these circumstances, if the enforcement of
particular default rules is to be justified as consensual, these
default rules should be chosen (a) to reflect the probable tacit
understandings of the parties, and (b) to reduce the likelihood
of subjective disagreements arising between the parties. 27
These functions are best performed by default rules that reflect
the common sense expectations in the community of discourse
to which the parties belong. 28 I call these "conventionalist" default rules. In attempting to determine the content of conventionalist default rules, a possible relationship between actual
consent and the hypothetical rational bargain emerges.
Although this relationship is, as Coleman suggests, "epistemic,
not analytic, " 29 the epistemic connection is different from what
he describes.
How do we determine the content of the parties' tacit understandings given that it is generally difficult either to discern
them directly or to determine the expectations that prevail in
the relevant community of discourse? A rational bargaining
26. See id. at 864-67.
27. See id. at 874-97.
28. See id.
29. CoLEMAN, supra note 1,

at

273.
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model-if it can deliver what Coleman promises30-could provide a good method for legal theorists to determine what most
parties' consent to jurisdiction means when their express
agreement is silent. If most parties tacitly expect that "fair"
default provisions will be supplied when gaps in their explicit
consent are revealed, rational bargaining theory may help determine what terms most parties deem to be fair. A court may
presume that the particular parties before it implicitly consented ex ante to the imposition of terms that would be in their
rational self-interest. In this manner, rational bargaining theory
may be able to capture the "common sense" meaning of the
parties' silence.
Of course, a presumption that any given pair of parties
would consider the "common sense" rules that result from a
rational bargaining analysis to be a fair way of resolving their
dispute could be factually mistaken in a particular case. Nonetheless, we may still be warranted in adopting a presumption in
favor of the rational default term if so doing will reduce the
incidence and severity of erroneous enforcement. In this way,
hypothetical consent may be seen as evidence of actual consent
on issues about which the parties are silent, and the rational
bargain may be viewed as evidence of hypothetical consent. Or,
perhaps more accurately, in the absence of empirical evidence of
what actual parties in the relevant community of discourse
mean when they consent in a particular situation, we may safely
presume that they intended the default rule suggested by a rational bargaining analysis.
In sum, given a practical assessment that most contracting
parties are rationally self-interested actors, we may adopt the
rational bargain as the presumptive meaning of consent. Thus,
a legal system would be morally justified in enforcing rational
background terms, unless it believes that the normal assumption of rationality did not hold. According to this account, the
rational bargaining model, although potentially useful, is
merely an interpretive "half-way house" between an actual
manifestation of consent and empirical evidence of what most
persons actually mean by such manifestations.
This is not to deprecate the practical value of the rational
30. I assume throughout this analysis that rational bargaining theory can actually
determine the content of a person's rational choice. If this assumption proves inaccurate, then a rational bargaining model cannot perform the role I identify (or any other).
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bargaining model to a legal system or to legal theorists. Despite
decades of cries for more empirical research into contracting
practice, such research is still rare. Moreover, as I discuss below, monopolistic legal regimes thwart the epistemic function
of a free market in legal jurisdictions, necessitating some effective substitute for discovering the actual intentions of most parties. Therefore, if consent is to be given a meaning that
corresponds to the actual meaning in the relevant community,
some more abstract method of approximating this meaning
without costly empirical research or market information would
be invaluable.
We now may tum to Coleman's charge that because "[t]he
default rules of any jurisdiction are generally a nonnegotiable
part of [the parties'] bargain," 31 the consent to jurisdiction approach is inapplicable in the absence of a competitive market in
jurisdictions. Without free choice among jurisdictions and
among packages of default rules that each jurisdiction provides, is not Coleman correct that we must still rely on hypothetical rather dian actual consent in our choice of default
rules? Coleman argues that if "the claim is that a default rule is
justified to the extent that it would be freely chosen in a competitive market for authoritative jurisdiction, then the defense of
[a] default rule itself relies upon arguments from hypothetical,
not explicit consent. " 32
While this argument has some merit, it does not support any
conclusions about a fundamental or necessary relationship between hypothetical and actual consent. Instead, it suggests only
that we must rely on hypothetical consent where consumer
choice is restricted. 33 Here, as elsewhere, the market is a
unique source of otherwise unobtainable information. 34 Rational bargaining theory may attempt to "mimic the market,"
but even the best rational bargaining theorists will sometimes
err in interpreting the meaning of the parties' consent to be
legally bound. So long as consumers of legal systems are denied free choice among legal jurisdictions, we are deprived of
31. CoLEMAN, supra note I, at 275.
32. /d. at 276.
33. See Randy E. Barnett, Pursuing justice in a Free Society: Part Two-Crime Prevmtion
and the Legal Order, 5 CRIM. jusT. ETHICS 30 (Winter/Spring I 986) (describing how a
more competitive legal order could function). A recent and more elaborate treatment
of this thesis can be found in BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW (1990).
34. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 902-05.

No.3]

Contract and Consent

793

market information with which to correct the errors produced
by rational choice or any other form of abstract theory.
Consider liquidated damages clauses, which reveal contracting parties' actual preference regarding the measure of recovery for breach of contract. When such provisions are known
to be readily enforceable, parties who remain silent are presumably satisfied with the prevailing default rule, which measures damages by the expectancy interest. When courts refuse
to enforce such provisions, however, we may be correct that by
remaining silent most parties have implicitly chosen the expec. tancy measure of damages, but we are denied access to a pool
of explicit choices to help confirm our interpretive hypothesis.
In sum, the circumstantial evidence of consent by silence to the
expectancy measure is greatly weakened. The parties' silence
may have resulted not from consent but instead from the futility of negotiating an express clause that is unlikely to be enforced. Thus, to the extent that freedom of contract in any
phase of contracting is absent,35 the silence of the parties on
any given issue is rendered considerably more ambiguous than
necessary.
Still, where parties are protected from having contracts imposed upon them in the absence of their manifested intention
to be legally bound, this consent can be viewed as a meaningful
act. Under these conditions, if a rational bargaining approach is
feasible, the default rules it recommends may well correspond
to the actual meaning of such consent for most parties. In this
way, while the nonexistence of a free market in legal jurisdictions deprives us of an extremely important source of knowledge about the meaning of a choice to be legally bound, it does
not completely undermine our ability to discern the meaning of
consent.
A consent theory, then, offers the following epistemic connection between consent and rational bargaining theory:
When parties manifest their consent to be legally bound, courts
often need to interpret the meaning of their silence with respect to "gaps" in their manifested assent. In such circumstances, silence is most likely to mean what the majority of
similarly situated persons thinks it means. Since most people
35. Even a consent theory of contract would limit freedom of contract in some ways,
as, for example, with consent to transfer inalienable rights. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y 179 (1986).
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are rational, silence most likely means what a rational person
would think it means. Rational bargaining theory promises
legal theorists seeking to determine the meaning of silence a
substitute for the empirical information provided either by social scientific research or by the market.
Thus, while rational bargaining theory may prove to be a
highly useful interpretive device in an informationally imperfect world, it has justificatory value only within a regime of actual consent. Absent a manifested intention to be legally
bound, interpreters using a rational bargaining approach simply have nothing to interpret. 36
II.

THE DUIY TO DISCLOSE AND THE LIBERAL
CoNCEPTION oF FRAuD

A. Coleman :r Analysis of the Duty to Disclose

Coleman's underestimation of the informational function of
contractual consent is also evident in his discussion of Laidlaw
v. Organ. 37 Laidlaw involved a tobacco purchase contract made
during the War of 1812. At the time the contract was executed,
the buyer had advance information that the treaty ending the
war had been signed, promising an end to the naval blockade
of New Orleans that had been suppressing the price of tobacco.
When asked by the seller if he knew anything that might affect
the price of tobacco, however, the buyer failed to disclose this
information. The legal issue was whether the seller could avoid
the contract because of this failure to disclose. Chief Justice
John Marshall, speaking for the Supreme Court, endorsed a default rule of nondisclosure:
The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of extrinsic circumstances which might influence the price of the
commodity, and which was exclusively within the knowledge
of the vendee, ought to have been communicated by him to
the vendor? The court is of the opinion that he was not
bound to communicate it. 38

Anthony Kronman has defended this rule by focusing attention on the incentives it provides for the deliberate production
36. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 859-73 (discussing the role of consent in justifying
contractual enforcement of default rules).
37. Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
38. /d. at 195 (quoted in CoLEMAN, supra note I, at 249).
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of valuable information. 39 Consequently, Kronman believes
that information that is casually obtained should have to be disclosed. In contrast, Coleman rejects the distinction between
deliberately and casually obtained information and instead
stresses that whether information is productive depends upon
whether it is predominantly "technological" in nature or
whether it is predominantly "redistributive."40
For Coleman, the crucial question is whether the value of the
information at issue "derives from technology, gains from allocating information more efficiently," or from "distribution,
wealth transfers that follow from price changes." 41 He maintains that
all information has a technological as well as a redistributive
dimension. In many cases, investment in information will be
socially efficient because the technological gains will outweigh the costs of investment. However, in some cases, the
technological effects will be less significant than the redistributive ones. In these cases, private investment can exceed
social retum.42

Applying this distinction, Coleman concludes that imposing a
duty to disclose is not always nonproductive or inefficient.
The efficiency of a property right in information depends
upon whether the technological or the distributive dimensions of the information dominate. If the information is
largely distributive in its impact, a property right in information may well be inefficient. So we should be reluctant to accept the conclusion that the best argument for a property
right in information as such is that it encourages efficient investment in gathering information.43

Both Kronman's efficiency analysis, which distinguishes between casually and deliberately discovered information, and
Coleman's efficiency analysis, which distinguishes between the
technological and redistributive effects of information, miss the
most important issue raised by mandating a duty to disclose
such "extrinsic" information.
39. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Infonnation, and the Law
11 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1978).

of Contracts,

40. Coleman takes this distinction from jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of
bifonnation and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. EcoN. REv. 651 (1977).
41. CoLEMAN, supra note 1, at 250.
42. /d. at 251.
43. /d. at 254.
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The Paradox of a Right of Nondisclosure

Once again the issue involves the meaning of silence. To fail
to disclose some fact is to remain silent about it. Those who
favor a duty to disclose contend that sometimes such silence
can constitute a fraudulent misrepresentation. This implication
of silence is graphically highlighted in the Laidlaw case by the
buyer's silence in the face of the seller's direct question concerning whether the buyer had any information that would affect the price of tobacco. The buyer's silence conveyed a false
representation that the buyer ·had no such information. Was
this intentional misrepresentation fraudulent? I say no.
All speculative resource trading involves betting on price
changes. Such speculation is impossible unless a legal system
adheres to the liberal conception of freedom of contract. The
liberal principle of freedom from contract requires that each
party obtain the other's consent before a transaction may receive legal protection; the liberal principle of freedom to contract protects the enforceability of the parties' manifestation of
consent from interference by others or from a change of mind
by one of the parties that is not consented to by the other.44
Enforcing a right to speculate on changes in resource prices
while permitting parties to withhold information concerning
the potential demand or supply of the traded resource provides
substantial social benefits that extend well beyond the parties
to a particular transaction. 45 True, as Kronman has stressed, a
right of nondisclosure creates incentives to generate useful information deliberately, but that is only one of its advantages.
Both Kronman and Coleman overlook the incentive that this
right creates to disseminate certain vital information, whether it
is acquired casually or deliberately.
At first glance, a rule permitting those in possession of information relevant to demand for particular scarce resources-or
44. For an extended account of the crucial social functions performed by these two
aspects of contractual freedom, see Barnett, supra note 2, at 829-59; see also Randy E.
Barnett, The Function of Several Property and Freedom of Contract, 9 Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y 62
(1992).
45. The analysis presented here does not apply to speculation on pure lotteries or
other "nonproductive" games of chance. The case for a right to engage in such speculation or gambling is quite different than that which can be made for a right to make
speculative resource transfers. I have offered this type of analysis of the right to consume intoxicating substances in Randy E. Barnett, Curing the Drug Law Addiction: The
Harmful Side-Effects ofLegal Prohibition, in DEALING Wrm DRUGS 73 (Ronald Hamowy ed.,
1987).
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what Marshall called "intelligence of extrinsic circumstances
which might influence the price of the commodity" 46-to withhold it from their trading partners seems inimical to the dissemination of such information. Closer analysis, however,
reveals that a nondisclosure rule does indeed promote that
end. To put the matter paradoxically, permitting persons to
conceal certain types of information best promotes the dissemination of that information.
The resolution of the paradox lies in the fact that, their verbal silence notwithstanding, the actions of persons in possession
of Marshall's extrinsic intelligence disseminate more information than mere words ever could. Both consenting to trade and
withholding one's consent importantly affect the market price
of a resource. 47 The movement of resource prices that such decisions cause in the aggregate conveys invaluable and otherwise
unobtainable48 knowledge. Resource prices produced both by
those who trade and those who decline to trade represent a
summation of innumerable amounts of radically-dispersed information concerning the competing alternative uses of scarce
resources and the relative subjective desirability of these uses.
Therefore, a person in possession of "windfall" information
concerning a particular scarce resource still contributes importantly to the welfare of others by causing the price of that resource to move in an information-revealing direction, whether
the direction is up, down, or unchanged. The price-effect of the
decision to trade or refrain from trading results notwithstanding that the trader may neither have produced the information
nor intentionally disclosed it. I do not claim that this informational process is perfect, but only that it is both vital and
irreplaceable.
Imposing a duty to disclose on those in possession of information concerning a future change in market demand for a resource eliminates the possibility of profiting from the
information, and thereby greatly reduces any incentive for po46. Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 195.
47. Many, including economists, often seem to forget that the prevailing market
price reflects the price at which the marginal seller is willing to transact with the _marginal buyer. The market price of, for example, a house is as influenced by the decisions
of all homeowners who prefer to hold on to their property rather than accept the prevailing market price as it is influenced by those at the margin who consent to such
transfers.
48. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 831-35 (discussing the limited accessibility of personal and local knowledge).
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tential traders to engage in information-revealing transactions.
Consequently, a legal duty to disclose extrinsic intelligence to
the other party would greatly reduce disclosures of this information to the society at large. Moreover, such a disclosure rule
would cause countless persons to be misled. By eliminating the
incentive to trade on information, enforcing a duty to disclose
would induce persons in possession of extrinsic intelligence inadvertently to convey to the market by their silence the inaccurate impression that future demand will be lower or higher
than they know it to be.
What makes Laidlaw v. Organ a "hard case" worthy of including in casebooks is the fact that the extrinsic information in
question would have reached the market (and society at large)
within hours no matter what the buyer did, thus obscuring the
pervasive informational benefits of a general nondisclosure
rule. In this regard, Laidlaw resembles the proverbial bar exam
question that asks whether it is murder to shoot and kill a man
who is falling from the top of Sears Tower as he passes the 50th
floor. After all, you are supposed to think, he was just seconds
away from death anyway. But the desired answer is that every
murder involves cutting short the life of someone who is going
to die anyway-in principle, the amount of time that the murder takes from the victim is immaterial. So too, the principle of
Laidlaw is that persons have a right to profit by trading on secret information that one day may reach the market by other
means.
Of course, if every murder cut only seconds from a person's
life, the doctrine of murder would probably be much different
than it is. Similarly, if all information bearing on the supply or
demand for resources would inevitably reach everyone within
hours even if persons in possession of new information withheld it, the social function performed by a right to withhold
such information from one's trading partner would be greatly
diminished. Indeed, the need for speculative commodity and
other exchanges would also be diminished. Any such scenario
is, however, pernicious fantasy.
What holds true for Kronman's distinction between deliberately and casually acquired information applies with equal force
for Coleman's application of Hirshleifer's distinction between
the distributional and technological effects of information. Like
Kronman, Coleman misses the fact that virtually all information
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concerning existing relative scarcity is hidden and only a regime of private property and freedom of contract is capable of
producing the price signals and movements that aggregate and
disseminate this information to society at large. To my mind,
the social function performed by private actors participating in
commodities markets using undisclosed information is crucial
whether or not the information also has a technological or a
redistributive effect.

C. Squaring Nondisclosure with the Prohibition Against Fraud
None of the foregoing analysis directly addresses the issue of
whether the failure to disclose extrinsic information is fraudulent. Mter all, a free market presupposes the illegality of both
forcibly and fraudulently induced rights transfers. I conclude
that although the buyer's silence in Laidlaw v. Organ was certainly intentionally misleading, it was not fraudulent. The root
of the problem stems not from the misleading nature of the
buyer Organ's answer but from the unfairness of the seller
Laidlaw's question. When viewed in the proper context,
Laidlaw's question can be seen to be inappropriate and, therefore, he is simply not entitled to a truthful answer.
To understand why, suppose that before each exchange
every commodities trader asked every other trader whether she
was in possession of any information that would affect the future demand for or supply of the commodity in question. An
entitlement to a truthful answer to such a question-that is, a
duty to disclose-would virtually eliminate the institution
within which both buyer and seller are operating. Therefore, in
this bargaining context, such questions should not be asked
and, if asked, need not be answered truthfully. Silence, however misleading, is the appropriate response.49
This insight highlights a more general and widely neglected
feature of legal theory that I call the "nonpervasiveness principle." Defenses to consensual obligation must describe exceptional circumstances that undermine the normal significance of
consent. 50 Any purported defense that would potentially apply
to every transaction cannot be legitimate, so long as consent is
deemed to justify contractual obligation.
49. An affirmative misrepresentation not offered in response to such an inquiry
would be quite another matter, however.
50. See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 22, at 318-19.
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This nonpervasiveness principle is not limited to contract defenses. It applies as well to every defense that purports to rebut
any form of prima facie legal obligation however grounded. No
legal defense that would work potentially in every case can be
permitted because, no matter how plausible such a purported
defense may appear, to allow it would be to undermine the
prima facie legal obligation it opposes. If the legal obligation at
issue is morally justified, no legal defense can be accepted
which entirely eliminates its operation. 51
Suppose in Laidlaw that instead of asking indirectly about the
blockade, the seller asked the following: "Would you be prepared to pay more for the tobacco than you are offering?"
Suppose further that the buyer lied and said, "No, this is my
top offer," when in fact he would be willing to double his offer.
Is this lie a fraud on the seller? According to the nonpervasiveness principle the answer must be no, because to hold otherwise would undermine virtually every such transaction. As I
discussed in the context of situations where persons conceal
the fact that they are acting as the agent of an "undisclosed"
principal:
In reality, every seller who agrees to a price necessarily assumes the risk that the buyer might have been willing and
able to pay more, just as every buyer assumes the risk that a
seller would have been willing or able to accept less. Because
such ignorance, whether conscious or not, is pervasive, it
cannot undermine the normal significance of consent. 52 •

To be fraudulent, then, a misstatement of fact must concern
some "intrinsic" (to borrow Justice Marshall's terminology)
characteristic of the resource itself as opposed to some knowledge relevant only to the "extrinsic" demand for the resource
in question. For example, it would be fraud to stand mute in
the face of a buyer's statement that "I assume that these eggs
are Grade A" when the seller knows them to be of an inferior
grade. It would not be fraudulent for the buyer to conceal her
knowledge of an important new study pronouncing eggs to be
far more healthful than previously thought. Although both
51. This principle can also be reversed: When a legal defense that invariably under·
mines a given legal obligation is found to be morally justified, then that legal obligation
is illegitimate.
52. Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency With Contract Theory, 75 CALIF. L.
REV. 1969, 1991 (1988).
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facts could, if disclosed, potentially affect the price of the eggs,
only the first involves the description of the eggs themselves.
The nonpervasiveness principle accounts for Justice Marshall's distinction between intelligence of extrinsic and intrinsic
circumstances. Still, a complete understanding of the rationale
for this distinction requires that we consider the different functions performed by the prohibitions of duress and fraud.
D.

The Functional Difference Between Duress and Fraud

A fundamental tenet of the liberal conception of justice is
that resources rightfully belonging to another may not be taken
without the manifested consent of the rights-holder. This tenet
bars the use or threat of force to obtain such consent; thus, a
adcontract signed or "consented to" under duress is void.
dition to this prohibition of force to obtain consent, liberalism
has always barred persons from obtaining consent by means of
fraud. Although the equating of force with fraud is both longasserted and well-accepted by liberals, its theoretical basis remains obscure. This is because these two doctrines perform
distinct functions.
Force is prohibited as a means of obtaining consent in important part because its use would legitimate transfers of resources that do not reflect the knowledge of the rights-holder
regarding the potential uses and value of the resource in question. Permitting forcible transfers disrupts the complex, but vital, mechanism of information dispersal that only consensual
transfers can make possible. The prohibition on the use of
force reflects an effort to handle what I call the "first-order
problem of knowledge," which consists of permitting persons
and associations to act on the basis of their diverse local and
personal knowledge while taking into account the knowledge of
others about which they are pervasively ignorant. 53
The function of the prohibition against fraud is related, but
nonetheless different. This prohibition reflects an effort to handle a problem of interpersonal communication. Unlike the case
of force or duress, a manifestation of consent that is fraudulently induced does reflect the knowledge of the person consenting, but the resources actually received by the defrauded

In

53. The analysis presented in this paragraph is merely a summary of that presented
in Barnett, supra note 2, and in Barnett, supra note 44.
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transferee do not conform to the description communicated by
the transferor. 54 Due to the transferor's failure to deliver resources conforming to the rights he communicated and conveyed by his manifestation of consent, a legal remedy is needed
to close the unjust gap that has arisen between the distribution
of resources and the distribution of rights.
In sum, when a seller uses duress to obtain the buyer's manifestation of consent, the transfer may not reflect the buyer's
knowledge; with fraud, the buyer's manifestation of consent
does reflect her knowledge but the resulting distribution of resources does not reflect the consent that was communicated.
This type of gap arises when there is a discrepancy between the
description of a resource's "intrinsic" qualities and the resources actually delivered. No such discrepancy occurs when
intelligence concerning extrinsic circumstances affecting the
supply of or demand for the resource is concealed.
Does this analysis of fraud, which accounts for the prohibition on transfers of rights induced by knowingly communicating false information, extend to the failure to convey true
information that, if known, would influence the decision of the
other party to consent to a transfer? The foregoing analysis
suggests that a duty to disclose should exist when the failure to
disclose creates a disparity between the rights transferred and
the resources received. This may occur, for instance, when (a)
an item, as it appears, would normally have certain intrinsic
characteristics, (h) a reasonable inspection will not reveal the
absence of these characteristics, (c) the seller knows that these
characteristics are absent, and (d) the seller has reason to know
that knowledge of this fact is "material," that is, it would likely
influence the manifestation of assent by the buyer. An example
of this is a product with a latent defect. When these circumstances obtain, the resources conveyed to the buyer do not
conform to the substance of the rights conveyed by the seller.
On the other hand, a duty to disclose is not warranted by this
analysis of fraud when the seller remains silent about a fact that
does not concern the substance of the rights being transferred.
In such a case, the seller does not deliver resources that fail to
54. For example, a defrauded buyer may know that she values the use of the re·
sources she is obtaining from the seller more than those she is transferring to the
seller, but the resources she actually receives do not conform to the description that
was communicated to her by the deceiving party.
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conform to the rights that were represented as being transferred. For example (to vary the facts of Laidlaw v. Organ), suppose a seller sells grain at a price that has been greatly
increased due to the shortages caused by a war. Although the
seller fails to communicate his knowledge that the war has
ended and consequently that prices are about to fall, he commits no fraud provided that he delivers grain of a quality and
quantity conforming to the rights that were communicated and
transferred.

IV.

CONCLUSION

In this article, I have applied my recently-expanded account
of a consent theory of contract to Jules Coleman's analyses of
contractual default rules and the duty of contracting parties to
disclose information to each other. First, I showed how, when
determining conventionalist default rules that reflect the common-sense meaning prevailing in a particular community of
discourse, a rational bargaining approach may usefully supplement or substitute for the information provided by market
choices or empirical research. At least in contract theory, however, a rational bargaining model has justificatory value, not as
an alternative to consent, but within an overall consensual
framework.
Second, I explained how both Anthony Kronman's distinction between deliberately and casually obtained information,
and Coleman's distinction between the technological and redistributive effects of information miss the more fundamental informational function of a right of nondisclosure. I showed that
the refusal of one contracting party to disclose information to
the other, even when asked, is not fraudulent when the information relates only to the supply or demand for the resources
that are the subject of the contract. My account involved both
the "nonpervasiveness principle" that applies to any defense to
prima facie legal obligation and an analysis of the distinct social
functions performed by the prohibitions on force and fraud.
Significantly, the analysis of both the role of hypothetical
consent and the legitimacy of a duty to disclose turned on the
informational functions that contractual consent uniquely
performs.

